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From the Gudardian
Unlimted Observer
The World Today essay
If it's good for America, it's good for
the world
Hopes of a new US multilateralism have been dashed. The Bush administration may
form coalitions when it suits the United States but its overriding mission is to
show the world why the American way is best.
The Bush files - Observer special
by Paul Rogers
Sunday January 27, 2002
The Observer
There was much talk of coalitions after the traumatic events of last September. Critics
of Washington's policies hoped that their agenda of international cooperation would
find new favour. They have been disappointed. What is right for America is regarded
by the White House as right for the world.
In the aftermath of the atrocities of September 11, there was a palpable sense of
support for the United States across much of the rest of the world. Condemnation
of the perpetrators was remarkably widespread and this was accompanied by an expectation
that a broadly-based multilateral coalition of states would quickly develop, with
Washington in the lead.
It was expected that this would contrast markedly with a widespread sense that the
administration of President George Bush had been pursuing a singularly unilateralist
stance since coming to power - a significant change from its predecessor. Moreover,
this was in contrast to opinion in Europe, and there was evidence of a developing
transatlantic divide. Several months on, has there been any shift in US attitudes?
Much of the unilateral approach to international security had developed from policies
pursued by the Republican majorities in Congress prior to President Bush's election.
There had already been strong opposition to the ratifying of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, and to UN proposals for an International Criminal Court. Even on the
issue of a ban on anti-personnel landmines, there was considerable suspicion.
In the first few months of the Bush administration this theme of unilateralism was
repeated many times. There was clearly no longer any interest in maintaining the
Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, there was opposition to an agreement to curb the weaponisation
of space, and a markedly critical approach to UN talks on controlling the transfers
of light arms.
These all indicated a strengthening of the unilateralist approach, but they were
relatively minor issues compared with two substantial policy changes. One was the
refusal to ratify the Kyoto climate change protocols and the other was sudden opposition
to the carefully negotiated protocol to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention. Both of these decisions caused consternation in Europe, as did
the disengagement from talks with north Korea and the relative lack of interest in
any Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
In contrast, European Union (EU) countries were stressing conflict prevention, were
quick to engage with north Korea, and emphasised Middle East peace negotiations.
The entry into the European Union of countries such as Sweden, with a distinct international
social awareness, was having an impact on EU policy. This was reflected in a greater
commitment to debt relief and some forms of development assistance, a determined
belief that the Kyoto protocols had to be rescued, and a far more positive attitude
to arms control, especially the strengthening of the bio-weapons treaty.
They are there
The origins of the US approach to international security prior to September 11 lie
in Republican thinking in the late 1990s, itself a rather interesting mirror of a
similar process two decades earlier. During Jimmy Carter's presidency in the late
1970s, powerful right-wing groups developed to advocate the re-arming of the United
States in the face of the perceived Soviet threat. Groups such as the Committee on
the Present Danger and High Frontier proposed a vigorous process of confronting the
ideological and military threat from Moscow. Many of those involved went on to serve
in the Reagan administration.
The context then was a bipolar world with international communism the clear threat
to US interests. By the end of the 1990s, the world was far more complex but there
was still a clear sense of threat, expressed most interestingly by George Bush in
an early campaign speech in January 2000:
"...it was a dangerous world and we knew exactly who the 'they' were. It was
us versus them and we knew exactly who them was. Now we're not so sure who the 'they'
are, but we know they're there."
Civilising force
Yet, in this uncertain and volatile world, there was a perceived need on the Republican
right for the United States to develop as the clear international leader, operating,
certainly, in its own interests, but in the belief that what is right for America
is right for the world. It comes from a deep-seated conviction that there is only
one economic system, the globalised free market, set in the political context of
liberal democracy.
In this view, the United States therefore has an historic mission to be a civilising
force in world affairs. History is at an end and the American way of life is predominant.
This will not be a neo-colonial controlling of the world but more a shaping, through
governmental, business and other processes, of a world economy and polity that is
broadly in the American image.
Groups analogous to the Committee on the Present Danger have been highly active in
recent years, and many of the key participants have gone on to take leading positions
in the Bush administration. One of the most significant, the Project for the New
American Century, includes among its supporters Vice-President Dick Cheney and Defence
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
It asks, in its statement of principles, "Does the United States have the resolve
to shape a new century favourable to American principles and interests?", arguing
that this is essential and that it is necessary "to accept responsibility for
America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly
to our security, our prosperity and our principles".
Benign Imperium
In the context of the response to the Twin Tower attacks, though, this does not mean
that the United States is only interested in unilateralism. Indeed it is thoroughly
engaged in many multilateral endeavours, not least negotiations on trade and intellectual
property rights. The point is that this is acceptable only when clearly in its own
interests. The attitude was captured with precision by Charles Krauthammer, in The
Weekly Standard on June 4 2001:
"Multipolarity, yes, when there is no alternative. But not when there is. Not
when we have the unique imbalance of power that we enjoy today - and that has given
the international system a stability and essential tranquility that it had not known
for at least a century.
The international environment is far more likely to enjoy peace under a single hegemon.
Moreover, we are not just any hegemon. We run a uniquely benign imperium."
The stability and essential tranquility of that benign imperium was shattered by
the hijackers, and it is worth reflecting on the extraordinary effects of those atrocities.
The Twin Towers were probably the most notable structures of post-war America. Visited
by millions of US citizens as well as foreign tourists they represented the core
of US commercial and financial dominance. More than 3,000 people were killed, a key
part of the US financial structure was damaged and the New York Stock Exchange itself
was closed for four days.
The effects of the attacks spread across the airline and aircraft industries to have
an impact on the whole economy, tipping it into temporary recession. Moreover, a
second attack struck right at the core of the military command structure, a strike
on the Pentagon that was relatively light in terms of casualties because the part
of the building hit by the airliner had been under renovation. Nevertheless, the
fact that the Pentagon itself could be shown to be so vulnerable caused deep anguish,
and anger, among many in the senior military.
Opposition to domination
While there was horror across the world at these events, there was also a realisation
in many countries and among many peoples that it was an expression, however atrocious,
of a deep opposition to US dominance that shows itself in much less violent forms
in many different ways. To the United States, though, it was a terrible symptom of
a potential threat to an absolutely essential world order, and one that required
a forceful and persistent response.
In the early weeks and months after the attack, the nature of that response became
clear, as did the extent of possible multilateral co-operation. Close links were
maintained with Britain, there was some support from some other western European
countries, and Pakistan was persuaded to facilitate attacks against the Taliban and
Al Qaeda. Russia recognised its singularly favourable geographic position and responded
with substantial support for the Northern Alliance, not least by providing it with
large quantities of armaments, reportedly financed by the United States.
At the same time, the United States adopted a military policy which fell far short
of using its ground forces to destroy the Taliban regime. Instead, it essentially
took sides in the long-running Afghan civil war, linking up with any faction that
opposed the Taliban. This, combined with heavy air strikes using area-impact munitions,
and special forces working with opposition fighters, added up to a proxy war in which
almost all the casualties were felt by various anti-Taliban militia. The combination
of sustained US air attack and the action of these militia rapidly dispersed the
Taliban regime and the Al Qaeda network, but not without cost - early estimates suggesting
at least three thousand civilian deaths.
In adopting this military strategy against the Taliban, the United States made some
use of partner countries. Chief among these was Britain, performing an essential
role in the aerial re-fuelling of carrier-based aircraft and deploying small numbers
of Special Air Services (SAS) and Special Boat Services (SBS) forces. But the use
was limited, and Britain's willingness to commit substantial ground troops to ensure
stability in northern Afghanistan early in the war was rebuffed with little ceremony.
Going alone
Moreover, wider issues indicated that unilateralism was alive and kicking. At the
start of the review conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Treaty at Geneva
in November, there was little indication of any increased US commitment to the protocol.
Indeed its firm opposition to the proposed treaty developments was finally declared
openly on the very last day of negotiations.
Shortly before this, the United States had failed to participate in a meeting concerning
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and President Bush's much-vaunted cut-back in
nuclear arsenals would be strictly independent. There would be no external verification
or monitoring, and there would be provision for the maintenance of substantial reserves
of warheads.
President Bush subsequently announced the withdrawal of the United States from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In an extraordinary demonstration of unilateralism
this was accompanied, almost to the day, by the "ripple firing" of four
Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This rare test, designed to simulate
war-time use of these strategic nuclear weapons, was an unmistakable signal, not
least to China, that the United States would develop missile defences while retaining
the world's most powerful offensive nuclear arsenal.
Perhaps the most significant development related to Afghanistan, where a presidential
directive was issued to establish military courts to deal with suspected terrorists.
This directive, issued on November 13, was reported to be the first since World War
Two. Such courts could convene in the United States or overseas, or even on ships
at sea, and it would be within the power of the president to determine who should
be tried.
The trials could be held in secret, would not need to involve juries and could give
sentences up to and including the death penalty. At the time the directive was issued,
a White House spokesperson described the presidential order as "an additional
tool to use as he sees fit to fight the war on terrorism and bring foreign terrorists
to justice". This development is in the context of the United States maintaining
persistent objections to the establishment of an independent International Criminal
Court under the auspices of the United Nations.
Atlantic divide
This and other aspects of the pattern of events would seem to indicate that little
has changed in terms of US security policy since September 11. Where cooperation
is necessary, then it will be sought, but where it is considered appropriate to pursue
unilateral policies, then this will be done with persistence and commitment. It follows
that disagreements with otherwise close allies are likely to continue and that the
trauma of those events has not resulted in a change of outlook.
In the context of the "war on terrorism", European support for the United
States will probably be maintained for remaining operations in Afghanistan, but far
greater difficulties may emerge if the United States does decide to take the war
to Iraq. In those circumstances, the potential divide between European and US approaches
to security that were evident before September 11 may become the core issue in transatlantic
relations.
· Paul Rogers is Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University. His latest
book, "Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century" (Pluto Press,
2000) has just been reprinted.
About The World Today essay
This article will appear in the February 2002 issue of The World Today, published
by the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House. An essay from The
World Today appears online at observer.co.uk each month.
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